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We study whether bank ownership is related to bank efficiency in Russia. We find that 
foreign banks are more efficient than domestic private banks and – surprisingly – that 
domestic private banks are not more efficient than domestic public banks. These results are 
not   driven   by   the   choice   of   the   production   process,   the   bank’s   environment,   the 
management’s risk preferences, the bank’s activity mix, size or the econometric approach. 
The evidence in fact suggests that domestic public banks are more efficient than domestic 
private banks and that the efficiency gap between these two types of banks is not lower after 
the introduction of deposit insurance in 2004. This may be due to increased switching costs 
or to the moral hazard effects of deposit insurance. The policy conclusion is that the 
efficiency of the Russian banking system may benefit more from increased levels of 
competition and higher access of foreign banks than from bank privatization.
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11. Introduction
This paper assesses the efficiency of the nascent Russian banking system. The central 
question we pose is whether bank ownership has any effect on bank efficiency in Russia. We 
discern foreign-owned banks (foreign banks), privately owned banks (private banks) and 
state-owned banks (public banks). We find that foreign banks are more efficient than 
domestic private banks and – surprisingly – that domestic private banks are not more 
efficient than domestic public banks. These results are not driven by differences in activity 
mix, risk preferences or bank environment and not explained by the absence of explicit 
deposit insurance for domestic private banks.
Transition countries appear to be a fertile testing ground for the comparative analysis 
of public and private banks’ efficiency, but first appearances can be deceiving. Indeed, this 
comparative analysis failed to yield clear answers because in most countries foreign entry and 
bank privatization went hand in hand. By consequence the empirical results for these 
countries were largely interpreted in terms of efficiency gaps between foreign and domestic 
ownership rather than between public and private ownership. In Russia however partial bank 
privatization was achieved relatively quickly, while foreign bank entry remained at a relatively 
low level in the first 15 years of transition
2. Still, partial public ownership in various forms 
remained a robust characteristic of the Russian banking sector throughout transition. The 
Central Bank of Russia (CBR) has played an important role through the commercial banks 
under her direct control, namely Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank. In addition, government 
bodies of several levels own banks. There are examples of villages, provinces, cities, federal 
bodies and state firms in this position. For October 2001 for example, we find that the 27 
banks that are majority owned by state bodies (out of 1277 banks in total) control 53% of 
banking assets and 39% of banking liabilities. Neglecting the CBR’s commercial banking 
activities through Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank., the remaining 25 public banks hold no less 
than 6% of total banking assets and 8% of total banking liabilities. The Russian banking 
industry therefore presents us with the exceptional opportunity to disentangle efficiency 
differences between foreign, public and private banks for a sufficiently large number of 
banks. This study is therefore a complement to the literature on foreign ownership and 
efficiency   in   emerging   market   economies   and   its   conclusions   contribute   to   our 
understanding of emerging market economies’ banking sectors. 
Efficiency   comparisons   between   public   and   private   banks   are   cumbersome   in 
emerging market economies because both types of banks are subject to different institutional 
environments, for example the implicit full deposit insurance typically enjoyed by public 
banks, but not by private banks. Any found differences in the cost effectiveness between 
2 The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) repeatedly showed its eagerness to cap foreign entry to the banking sector. 
The Association of Russian Banks has consistently lobbied the government to limit foreign bank entry using 
the classic infant industry protection argument. Russia was ultimately forced to commit itself to a gradual 
opening of its financial market to foreign competition because of its desire to entry the WTO.
2private and public banks may therefore be attributable to this difference in deposit insurance, 
which may render public banks’ access to deposits less costly in terms of labor and physical 
capital. In Russia too, public banks were always covered, albeit implicitly, by deposit 
insurance, while household deposits held at private banks are covered by deposit insurance 
only since 2004. To control for this we perform our estimations for two sub-samples, one 
before (2002) and one after (2006) the introduction of deposit insurance for household 
deposits at private banks. This allows us to assess whether any found difference in efficiency 
may be partly attributable to differences in deposit insurance and whether the more level 
playing field of generalized deposit insurance for household deposits effectively reduces the 
efficiency difference.
In the following section we overview the bank efficiency literature in connection with 
our study. Section 3 presents the recent history of the Russian banking sector. This is 
followed by an overview of the data in section 4 and the estimation methodology in section 
5. Section 6 lays out the main results. Section 7 provides further robustness checks by 
repeating the analysis for a size -matched sample and employing a very different econometric 
approach. We end with concluding remarks in section 8.
2. Related literature
The empirical literature on privatization in transition countries has found that the 
method and timing of privatization are related to its performance effects. Frydman et al. 
(1999) find that privatization has no beneficial effect on performance if firms fall under the 
sway of insider owners (managers or employees), while the positive performance effect is 
pronounced if the firm is privatized to outsider owners. Brown et al. (2006) document that 
foreign privatization has larger productivity effects than domestic privatization in a set of 
four transition countries. 
There is also ample evidence for transition countries that foreign firms are more 
efficient than domestic firms, be it in the banking sector or in other sectors. Foreign banks 
may be more efficient than domestic ones because of their more advanced technology, 
superior management practices, better access to capital or the implicit deposit insurance 
through the deep pockets of the foreign mother bank.
These economy-wide results are sustained by more detailed banking sector studies that 
apply stochastic frontier models. Weill (2003) shows in a study of the Czech Republic and 
Poland that foreign-owned banks are indeed more efficient than domestic-owned banks and 
that this is driven neither by differences in bank size nor by differences in the structure of 
activities. Hasan and Marton (2003) find in a Hungarian country-study that foreign banks 
were more efficient already in the period 1993-1997, early in transition. Fries and Taci 
(2005) find in a study of 15 East European transition countries (including Russia) that 
private banks are more cost efficient than state-owned banks. Within the class of private 
3banks, they confirm the result of Weill (2003) that privatized banks with majority foreign 
ownership are the most cost efficient. These are followed by newly established private banks, 
both domestic and foreign owned, and finally by privatized banks with majority domestic 
ownership, though these are still more efficient than state-owned banks. Bonin et al. (2005a) 
analyze the effects of ownership on bank efficiency on a set of eleven transition countries 
for the period 1996-2000. They apply a stochastic frontier approach to compute bank-
specific efficiency scores and relate these to ownership in second-stage regressions. Foreign-
owned banks are again confirmed to be more cost-efficient, collect more deposits and grant 
more loans than other banks. The magnitude of increased efficiency from foreign ownership 
is 6% or higher. State-owned banks are not appreciably less efficient than de novo domestic 
private banks, but they are less efficient than those already privatized and, which provides 
support to the idea that better banks were privatized first. In a companion paper with 
comparable methodology Bonin et al. (2005b) analyze whether the method and the timing of 
bank privatization affect bank efficiency. They find that voucher privatization does not lead 
to increased efficiency and early-privatized banks are more efficient than later-privatized 
banks. 
Kraft, Hofler and Payne (2006) study the Croatian banking system and find that new 
private and privatized banks are not more efficient than public banks and that privatization 
does not immediately improve efficiency, while foreign banks are substantially more efficient 
than all domestic banks.
A number of studies apply data envelopment analysis to examine bank efficiency in 
Central and Eastern Europe. These include for example Grigorian and Manole (2006), who 
study 17 European transition countries, Jemric and Vujcic (2002), who look at Croatia, and 
Havrylchyk (2006), who studies Poland. In accordance with the findings of the stochastic 
frontier literature, all studies find that foreign banks are more efficient than domestic ones. 
Grigorian and Manole (2006) find in addition that privatization does not automatically lead 
to higher efficiency, which is in line with Bonin et al. (2005a). This superior efficiency of 
foreign banks is however not necessarily found in other emerging market economies. 
Sensarma (2006) finds for India that foreign banks are less efficient than either public or 
private domestic banks.
Two studies investigate bank efficiency in Russia. Fries and Taci (2005) study the cost 
efficiency of banks from 15 post-communist countries including Russia between 1994 and 
2001. They apply the one-stage Battese and Coelli (1995)’s stochastic frontier model and find 
that foreign ownership and private ownership are both associated with greater efficiency. 
Their findings, however, are based on a cross-country sample and need, therefore, not 
equally hold for every country. This observation is particularly relevant for Russia given their 
very limited sample of Russian banks (48 out of more than 1000 existing banks).
Styrin (2005) solves these problems by using a large dataset of Russian banks obtained 
from the Central Bank of Russia for the period 1999-2002. While efficiency scores are 
estimated in a first stage with the stochastic frontier approach, they are regressed on a set of 
4potential determinants including public ownership and foreign ownership in a second stage. 
Public ownership is innovatively defined as the actual affiliation with the state measured by 
the ratio of interest income received from the government to total interest income. This 
paper concludes in favor of a better efficiency of foreign banks, whereas public ownership is 
not significant to explain efficiency. The econometric two-stage approach and the exclusion 
of physical capital from the list of inputs are the paper’s major limitations. 
We use a similar dataset extended to 2006 and adopt the one-stage approach proposed 
by Battese and Coelli (1995) to investigate the cost efficiency of Russian banks. Next to 
solving the limitations of previous studies we contribute to the literature by studying whether 
the introduction of generalized deposit insurance had any effects on banks’ comparative 
efficiency.
3. History and problems of the Russian banking sector
The privatization of Russia’s former ‘spetsbanki’
3 was a relatively uncontrolled process 
that started before 1990 -the official start of bank privatization process- and was largely 
accomplished by the end of 1991, when the Soviet system collapsed. This secessionist 
privatization yielded a few large successors (Sberbank, Vneshtorgbank, Mosbiznesbank, 
Promstroibank and SBS–Agro) and more than 600 relatively small successors. Most of these 
were reluctant to restructure, as mirrored in higher costs, higher loan rates, poorer loan 
quality and smaller capital buffers (see Schoors, 2003). Not surprisingly most of the smaller 
successors faltered in the period 1995-1998. In the aftermath of the August 1998 crisis the 
larger successors were also swept away, with the notorious exceptions of Sberbank and 
Vneshtorgbank which survived as daughters of the CBR and now control a considerable part 
of the Russian banking market
4. At present, the vast majority of Russian banks are 
unburdened by lingering Soviet deficiencies: most private banks are de novo banks -the 
privatized ‘spetsbanki’ faltered in the period 1992-1999-, while most public banks have been 
created after the collapse of the Soviet Union by government bodies like state enterprises, 
cities and federal, regional or local governments (see Tompson, 2004 and Vernikov, 2007). 
In our sample we count 25 of the latter category. Still, the banking sector has been faced 
with a number of serious problems throughout its history.
3  In 1987 the Soviet Union turned its monobank system into a kind of two tier banking system with a 
embryonal central bank (Gosbank) and specialized ‘commercial banks’. These were Sberbank (the savings 
bank),   Promstroibank   (industry   and   construction),   Zhilsotsbank   (housing   and   communal   financing), 
Agroprombank (Agriculture) and Vneshtorgbank.(foreign trade). These specialized banks are commonly 
referred to as ‘spetsbanki’.
4 In its 2005 Annual Report, Sberbank claims it holds 54.2% of total retail deposits, 44.1% of consumer loans, 
32.2% of corporate loans, 16.6% of government securities and 26.5% of total Russian banking assets. The 
share in ruble-denominate retail deposits is even higher with more than 70%.
5Early in transition, banks clearly preferred speculation to lending (Schoors, 2001). 
Bank lending to the non-financial sector shrank year after year as a share of total banking 
assets until 1999.  In 2003, bank loans to the non- financial sector only amounted to just 
17.0% of GDP and financed as little as 4.8% of fixed investment.
5 Since then the situation 
has improved. This reluctance to lend seems rational with hindsight. The presence of soft 
legal constraints (Perotti, 2002) rendered the enforcement of overdue claims difficult to 
impossible. Bank lending was further depressed by huge information asymmetries between 
banks and their prospective customers, and by the lack of screening and monitoring skills in 
the banks themselves and the economy at large. Banks were therefore unable to identify 
good potential borrowers (Brana, Maurel and Sgard, 1999), and often preferred not to lend 
at all. Moreover, the vast amount of tiny banks and the lack of a transparent information 
system about credit histories may have contributed to depressing lending (Pyle, 2002). 
The largest part of the lending went to connected agents, regardless of the viability of 
the lending project, and with only very weak monitoring incentives (Laeven, 2001). Many of 
the newly founded private banks were captured by their owners. Such  “pocket banks” 
operated as treasuries for a firm or a group of firms rather than independent banks. Note 
that the government, too, is to some extent a connected party, because several banks are 
captured by local, regional, or national governments. At the start of 2003, federal or regional 
authorities held majority stakes in 23 banks, the regional authorities held minority stakes in 
several more banks and a large number of state enterprises were part-owners of banks 
(Tompson, 2004). 
The average loan quality was negatively affected by the combined problems of 
connected lending, soft legal constraints, information asymmetries and the lack of screening 
and monitoring skills. A leaked analysis of Russian banks after the crisis of August 1998 
shows that the major cost for banks was not the devaluation loss or the government default 
on treasury bills, but bad loans hidden and accumulated during the preceding period.
6 
Schoors and Sonin (2005) explain how the Russian banking system was stuck in a passivity 
trap, where it is rational for each individual bank to hide bad loans rather than collecting 
them. Economic growth after 2000 allowed Russian banks to ‘grow’ out of bad loans, but 
the problem of loan quality is still a latent threat to the Russian banking system. 
The Russian banking sector has in the past suffered from poor capitalization, 
especially considering the poor quality of assets and the large exposure to exchange rate risk. 
This overexposure was revealed when the devaluation in August 1998 sent capital of many 
Russian banks from positive to negative overnight (Perotti, 2002). The CBR has steadily 
tightened capital standards since 1999 and Claeys and Schoors (2007) show that these 
standards are indeed enforced. As a result capital levels have reached more acceptable levels. 
Still our data reveal that the average capitalization of the Russian banks is substantially higher 
5 Data from the CBR Bulletin of Bank Statistics.
6 See ’The newly-wed and the nearly dead’, Euromoney, June 1999.
6than the weighted average capitalization, implying that the capital buffer is lower in the 
banks that are most important for systemic stability.
The institutional stability of Russian banks has proven weak with systemic problems in 
1994, 1995, 1998 and 2004. Since 1992, more than 2000 Russian banks were liquidated or 
vanished. Sometimes this was due to a combination of the above-mentioned factors (poor 
capitalization, excessive speculative risk, endemic bad loans, connected lending, etc.), but 
there were also several cases of Ponzi schemes where crooks cheated depositors and fled 
with their money. In the aftermath of the August 1998 crisis it became apparent that the soft 
legal constraints faced by banks encouraged asset stripping and left creditors to bear the 
brunt of the cost of failure (Perotti, 2002). Claeys and Schoors (2007) give an overview of 
the CBR’s relatively weak prudential supervision and control during the first decade and 
show that a policy rule-based enforcement of bank standards is difficult for the CBR because 
of  conflicts   with   systemic   stability   concerns.   Depositors   reacted   to   this   widespread 
institutional instability by either disciplining their banks in a sophisticated way
7 (Karas, Pyle 
and Schoors, 2006) or fleeing to the safe heavens of Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank that –like 
all public banks- were covered by an implicit state guarantee
8 (see OECD, 2004). Figure 1 
shows how Sberbank’s share of private deposits
9 reached a peak of close to 80% in 1998.   
The government wanted to restore some competition in the deposit market and 
reacted by providing a form of partial deposit insurance. The federal law on deposit 
insurance was introduced in 2003, but the system became only operational in September 
2004
10. Sberbank was initially exempted and kept its full state guarantee until the 1st of 
January 2007, when it finally became subject to the new deposit insurance scheme. Other 
regulatory advantages of Sberbank (for example lower required reserves on ruble deposits) 
were also abolished. This gradually more level playing field ensured that Sberbank’s share of 
private deposits gradually fell during the last five years to a still very high level of about 50% 
in 2006 (see figure 1). 
In table 1 we summarize some of the crucial indicators of the recent developments of 
the Russian banking system. By early 2006 there were 1253 banks, among which only 1045 
money deposit banks (covered by the deposit insurance scheme) with 3295 bank branches. 
More than 30% of these bank branches were however still operated by Sberbank, such that 
the average bank had about two branches. Clearly the average Russian bank is tiny when 
compared to European or world standards. By 2006 the Russian market counted 62 majority 
7 By interpreting very high promised deposit rates as a proxy of institutional instability.
8 Sberbank has a huge branch network and carries a government guarantee. The government lent credibility to 
this guarantee by supporting Sberbank when needed and using it as a device to absorb deposits from large 
defunct deposit banks in the aftermath of the 1998 crisis. The same holds for Vneshtorgbank as demonstrated 
in the mini-crisis in May–July 2004, when Vneshtorgbank acquired Gutabank, one of the larger deposit banks 
under attack. As a result, Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank continue to dominate a highly concentrated deposit 
market. 
9 Both ruble- and foreign currency-denominated private deposits.
10 Although an unrelated and opaque form of state guarantee was already granted to all banks in July 2004 to 
stop the evolving banking panic.
7foreign-owned banks, but their branch network was still relatively underdeveloped. On the 
other hand banking has clearly revived during the last five years, with bank lending rising 
from 17% of GDP in 2001 to 32% of GDP in 2006 and private deposits rising from 8% of 
GDP to 14% of GDP over the same period. Average interest rates seem still high in nominal 
terms but are low once inflation is taken into account. Clearly Russian banks are increasingly 
playing their role as effective intermediaries between savings and investments, but the 
banking system still suffers from the predominance of tiny banks with underdeveloped 
branch network, excessive concentration and lack of foreign competition. Although private 
deposit collection is growing it remains far behind corporate lending. 
4. Data and variables
The quarterly bank balances and profit and loss accounts were made available to the 
authors by the financial information agency Interfax
11. The chosen sample periods (2002 and 
2006) are convenient to properly detect longitudinal effects of private ownership. Brown et 
al (2006) find that positive effects of domestic privatization appear immediately in Hungary, 
Romania, and Ukraine, but emerge only five years after privatization in Russia. In our study 
almost all remaining banks are de novo banks and the few remaining privatized banks are 
considered 10 years or more after privatization, so any positive efficiency effects are 
expected to have appeared by then. 
The panel is unbalanced because some banks fail, some merge, and some are founded 
during the sample period. If a bank merged or was acquired we treat the resulting larger bank 
as “new”. To identify foreign banks, we use the quarterly lists of 100% foreign-owned banks 
provided by the CBR since 1999. The lists of banks with the state as a majority owner are 
available at two points in time, February 1, 2002 (Matovnikov, 2002) and July 1, 2005 
(Mamontov, 2005). These lists reveal that the state ownership category remains stable over 
our sample period.
We perform estimations before (2002) and after (2006) the introduction of deposit 
insurance in 2004. For each sub-period, we use a balanced panel which is more convenient 
for the application of the Battese and Coelli (1995)’s model. As efficiency scores are relative 
measures of performance, we need to have comparable banks in terms of practiced activities. 
We therefore only keep banks with both shares of deposits and loans in total assets greater 
than 10%. Our final sample consists of 747 banks (including 19 public banks and 26 foreign 
banks) for 2002 and 471 banks (including 15 public banks and 20 foreign banks) for 2006.
The literature disagrees on the role of deposits in the production process of banks. The 
classical production approach treats deposits and loans as outputs and labor and physical 
capital as inputs. The intermediation approach first used by Sealey and Lindley (1977) views 
11 Karas and Schoors (2005) provide a detailed description of the dataset and confirm its consistency with other 
data sources.
8banks as intermediaries between savings and investments in the economy and treats earning 
assets as outputs and deposits as inputs.
The weak development of financial markets makes a clear focus on the lending and 
deposit activities of banks relevant for Russia. Therefore we tend to prefer the production 
approach in this paper. The intermediation approach has the disadvantage that deposits are 
neglected   as   an   important   output.   There   exists   also   an   argument   in   favor   of   the 
intermediation approach though. Public and foreign banks might have access to cheaper 
funding if depositors believe those banks to possess additional protection compared to 
private domestic banks. Public banks have enjoyed the explicit state guarantee backing their 
retail deposits, which was scrapped only at the end of 2003. In addition their cost of funds is 
reduced by the perception that the state will stand behind them (Tompson, 2004). Foreign 
banks’ deposits may also enjoy an implicit (by the mother bank) or an explicit deposit 
guarantee (in some countries clients of foreign branches of domestic banks are covered 
under the national deposit insurance scheme). Such guarantees, be they perceived or real, 
could affect input prices for deposits, but this is not considered in the production approach, 
because the deposit cost is not included in the measure of total costs. This gives a rationale 
for the use of the intermediation approach, that considers deposits as an input rather than an 
output and that includes the cost of deposits in the measure of total costs. In robustness 
checks, we will substitute the intermediation for the production approach. Our results are 
however robust to the choice of the production process. This is not unexpected given the 
finding of Wheelock and Wilson (1995) and Berger et al. (1997), that the choice of the 
approach may have a considerable impact on the level of the efficiency scores but not on 
their rankings.
For the production approach, the output variables are total deposits and total loans. 
The input prices are the price of physical capital, measured by the ratio of other operating 
expenses to fixed assets, and the price of labor, measured by the ratio of personnel expenses 
to total assets
12 as data on the number of employees is not available (Altunbas et al. 2000, 
Weill, 2003). As observed by Maudos et al. (2002), the latter ratio can be interpreted as labor 
cost per worker (personnel expenses to number of employees) adjusted for differences in 
labor productivity (number of employees to total assets), since it is the product of these 
ratios. Total costs are the sum of personnel expenses and other operating expenses. Controls 
for environment, risk preferences and activities mix include seven geographical district 
dummies, the log of total assets, the log of equity, the share of bad loans in total loans, and 
the percentage breakdown of banks’ total deposits and loans by counterpart (households, 
firms, government, banks). 
For the intermediation approach, the output variables are total loans and total 
securities, while the input prices are the deposit rate (measured as the ratio of interest paid 
on deposits to interest bearing deposits), the price of physical capital (as defined before), and 
12 We use the Tukey box-plot to detect outliers: for each input price we drop observations lying out of the 
range defined by the first and third quartile minus/plus two times the interquartile range.
9the price of labor (as defined before). Total costs are the sum of interest paid on deposits, 
personnel expenses and other operating expenses.
Table 2 compares the means of key variables of private and public banks. Table 3 does 
the same for domestic and foreign banks. Both public and foreign banks are much bigger, 
slightly less capitalized and more frequently located in the Moscow area relative to their 
counterparts, respectively, private and domestic banks. These patterns are more pronounced 
in the second sub-period. Compared to private banks, public banks grant relatively more 
loans to companies and banks and relatively less loans to households. Not surprisingly, 
public banks rely relatively more on the government as a source of funding. Foreign banks 
are extremely active on the interbank market, both in terms of borrowing and lending, while 
domestic banks are predominantly occupied with core activities: granting loans to companies 
and individuals and collecting core deposits. For all bank categories household deposits have 
become a much more important source of funding over time.
5. Methodology
This section develops the methodology adopted to estimate cost efficiency of Russian 
banks. Cost efficiency measures how close a bank cost is to what a bank optimal cost would 
be for producing the same bundle of outputs. It then provides information on wastes in the 
production process and on the optimality of the chosen mix of inputs.
Several techniques have been proposed in the literature to measure efficiency with 
frontier approaches. While nonparametric approaches, e.g. DEA, use linear programming 
techniques, parametric approaches, such as stochastic frontier approach or distribution-free 
approach, apply econometric tools to estimate the efficiency frontier. We adopt stochastic 
frontier approach in our study, following many studies on banking efficiency in transition 
countries (Weill, 2003; Bonin et al., 2005a; Fries and Taci, 2005). In comparison to DEA, 
this approach presents the advantage to disentangle inefficiency from a statistical noise 
taking exogenous events into account in the residual (the distance from the efficiency 
frontier). In section 7 we also present DEA estimates as additional robustness checks.
The stochastic frontier approach assumes that total cost deviates from the optimal cost 
by a random disturbance, v, and an inefficiency term, u. Thus the cost function is TC =  f(Y, 
P) + e  where TC represents total cost, Y is the vector of outputs, P the vector of input 
prices and  e  the error term which is the sum of  u  and  v.  u  is a one-sided component 
representing cost inefficiencies, meaning the degree of weakness of managerial performance. 
v  is   a   two-sided   component   representing   random   disturbances,   reflecting   luck   or 
measurement errors. u and v are independently distributed. u is assumed to have a truncated 
normal distribution, while v is assumed to have a normal distribution. sv² and su² are the 
respective variances of u and v. According to Jondrow et al. (1982), firm-specific estimates of 
10inefficiency terms can be calculated by using the distribution of the inefficiency term 
conditional on the estimate of the composite error term.
The more straightforward procedure is the so-called “two-stage procedure”: the 
stochastic frontier model is estimated in the first stage, while the obtained efficiency scores 
are regressed on a set of explanatory variables including ownership variables in the second 
stage. Although often applied in the literature, this two-stage procedure presents two 
important econometric problems, as observed by Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). First, it 
assumes that the efficiency terms are identically distributed in the estimation of the 
stochastic frontier model of the first stage, while in the second stage this assumption is 
contradicted by the fact that the regression of the efficiency terms on the explanatory 
variables suggests that the efficiency terms are not identically distributed. Second, the 
explanatory variables must be assumed as uncorrelated with the variables of the cost frontier 
function, or else the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the cost frontier 
function would be biased because of the omission of the explanatory variables in the first 
stage. But then, the estimated efficiency terms that are explained in the second stage are 
biased estimates, as they are estimated relative to a biased representation of the cost frontier.
Therefore, we choose to use the “one-stage procedure” proposed by Battese and Coelli 
(1995), which solves these econometric problems. They propose a procedure for panel data, 
in which the non-negative inefficiency term is assumed to have a truncated distribution with 
different means for each firm. As a result, the distributions of the inefficiency terms are not 
the same, but are expressed as functions of explanatory variables. The inefficiency terms are 
then independently but not identically distributed. They are obtained by truncation at zero of 
the N(mit , su²) distribution: mit = zit d, where zit is a vector of explanatory variables, and d   is 
a vector of parameters to be estimated.
The estimated model consists of the cost frontier function and an equation explaining 
inefficiency. As is common in the literature on bank efficiency in transition countries (Weill, 
2003, Bonin et al., 2005a, Fries and Taci, 2005) we use a standard translog specification of 
the cost frontier:
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where TC total cost, ym m
th bank output (m=1,2), pl price of labor, pk price of physical 
capital, e the composite error term. Inefficiency is a function of bank-specific variables:
11uit =d zit + Wit (2)
where uit is the inefficiency, zit is a p*1 vector of explanatory variables, d is a 1*p vector 
of parameters to be estimated, Wit is a random variable defined by the truncation of the 
normal distribution with mean zero and variance s² (s² = su² + sv²). We use the software 
program Frontier 4.1 to perform the maximum likelihood estimation of the cost frontier.
6. Results
We estimate the efficiency model for the period before generalized deposit insurance 
(2002) and after generalized deposit insurance (2006) to check whether the implementation 
of the deposit insurance has modified the differences in efficiency between banks with 
different types of ownership. In all estimations, we include bank ownership variables in the 
equation  explaining  inefficiency. Two  alternative definitions of  public  ownership are 
employed. On the one hand, we include a dummy variable taking the value of one whether 
the bank is publicly-owned. On the other hand, following Styrin (2005), we measure public 
ownership by the ratio of interest income received from the government to total interest 
income. Foreign ownership is taken into account through a dummy variable equal to one 
whether the bank is foreign-owned.
Insert table 4 around here
Table 4 describes the main results. While Panel A presents the results when public 
banks are defined according to the ownership, panel B presents those when public banks are 
defined according to their activities. In the interpretation, one has to keep in mind that the 
econometric model identifies inefficiency. Therefore a minus sign indicates that an increase 
in the explanatory variable implies lower inefficiency, i.e. higher efficiency.
The baseline specification (a) of panel A shows that foreign banks are more efficient 
than domestic private banks and public banks, and that public banks are more efficient than 
domestic private banks after the introduction of deposit insurance. Indeed, while the 
estimates for public ownership are negative and insignificant in specification (a), specification 
(d) indicates that the efficiency gap between public banks and domestic private banks 
becomes significant after the introduction of generalized deposit insurance. In an economic 
sense, the found efficiency differences are considerable. This is also true in panel B where 
public banks are identified according to their activities rather than their ownership. 
In the baseline specifications (a) and (d), we implicitly assume that bank’s environment 
(determined by its location) and risk preferences are management choices. One could 
however argue that environment is exogenous to management decisions. Consequently, the 
12influence of environment should be disentangled to have a satisfactory measure of bank 
efficiency. In this strand of literature, Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) have notably shown 
that environment may explain the cross-country differences in bank efficiency. Furthermore, 
Hugues and Mester (1993) and Mester (1996) have shown that efficiency differences may 
also come from differences in managers’ risk preferences. Indeed the degree of risk aversion 
has an impact on cost efficiency. Risk-loving managers may keep the capital down to its 
cost-minimizing level (the regulatory threshold), while risk-averse managers may prefer to 
hold higher levels of capital. Consequently, by omitting the level of equity in the cost 
frontier, we may consider a bank as inefficient while it behaves optimally given the risk 
preferences of its managers. Berger and Mester (1997) provide an additional reason to 
include the level of equity into the estimation of the cost efficiency model, based on the fact 
that the insolvency risk of the bank depends on the equity available to absorb losses. This 
insolvency risk may lead to higher bank costs
13. This issue has a particular importance in 
transition economies like Russia where the insolvency risk of banks is not negligible.
In specifications (b) before generalized deposit insurance and (e) after generalized 
deposit insurance, we therefore include some environmental variables in the cost frontier. 
We use information on the district of the bank, taking into consideration the geographical 
breakdown of Russia in 7 districts. We therefore include 6 dummy variables, which are equal 
to one whether the bank is located in the concerned district, in the cost frontier. In 
specifications (c) and (f), we include the logarithm of equity in the estimation of the cost 
frontier to control for risk preferences in addition to environmental variables, following 
notably Mester (1996), Altunbas et al. (2000) and Weill (2003). All these specifications show 
that the baseline results are very robust. Foreign banks remain consistently the most efficient 
ones and public banks remain consistently more efficient than domestic private ones. 
This first set of results suggests that in Russia public banks are more rather than less 
efficient than domestic private banks. This is in accordance with Styrin (2005) but differs 
from Fries and Taci (2005). Note however that the latter study obtained results on a cross-
country sample from 15 transition countries including only a very limited sample of Russian 
banks. In addition, our results surprisingly suggest this efficiency advantage was enhanced 
rather than reduced by the implementation of the deposit insurance scheme.
Since the results in table 4 do not take into account the possible effect of systematic 
differences in the deposit rate
14, table 5 repeats the regressions of table 4, applying the 
intermediation approach instead of the production approach. In the intermediation approach 
the deposit rate is an input cost in the cost function and the total deposit cost is included of 
the measure of total cost. 
13 In our framework, higher solvency risk could affect the costs of the considered cost function through higher 
labor costs and higher costs of physical capital (to convince depositors to lay out their deposits, banks with 
lower capital need to invest more in their branch network).
14 Public banks could have systematically lower deposit rates than private banks.
13Insert table 5 around here
The estimates in table 5 indicate that our unexpected results are very robust to the 
choice of a production process. Applying the intermediation approach, we again find that 
foreign banks exhibit superior efficiency, that public banks tend to be more efficient than 
domestic private banks and that the latter efficiency gap becomes statistically significant after 
the introduction of deposit insurance. It is suggested therefore that the superior efficiency of 
public over private banks is not an inheritance of some communist past, but a fact of 
contemporaneous Russian banking markets.  
One explanation for this puzzle could be that public and private banks have different 
sets of activities and that the typical activity mix of public banks involves fewer costs than 
the one typically exerted by private banks. In table 6, we test this idea by including measures 
of the activity mix in the equation explaining inefficiency. 
Include table 6 around here
In each panel of table 6, we consider the activity mix in the form of lending and 
deposit shares by type of customer (households, firms, government, bank) and the average 
loan quality (measured as the ratio of classified loans to total loans).
15 In panels A and B we 
apply the production approach, in panels C and D the intermediation approach. Panels A 
and C identify public banks through ownership, while panels B and D identify public banks 
through revealed activities with the government. In each panel we have 4 specifications. In 
specification (a) we include the regional dummies in the estimation of the efficient frontier 
and all the activity mix variables in the equation explaining inefficiency. In specification (b) 
we additionally include equity in the estimation of the efficient frontier. In specification (c) 
we include the regional dummies and the activity mix variables in the estimation of the 
efficient frontier, leaving only the loan quality as explanatory variable for the residual 
inefficiency. In specification (d) we include the regional dummies, equity and the set of 
activity mix variables in the estimation of the frontier, again leaving only loan quality as 
explanatory variable for the residual inefficiency. Our three main results are very robust to all 
these exercises. Foreign banks are again more efficient than domestic private banks. Public 
banks tend to be more efficient than domestic private ones. This effect seems to be stronger 
after than before the introduction of deposit insurance. Moreover some results become 
stronger rather than weaker in some cases. In panel A for example (production approach, 
public ownership), the public banks superior efficiency now becomes statistically evident 
even  in   pre   deposit   insurance   period.   In   panel   C   (intermediation  approach,   public 
ownership) the public banks become less inefficient than even the foreign banks in the pre-
deposit insurance period. 
15 Since the bank share and the government share are zero for many banks, their sum is the omitted variable for 
both lending and deposits. The results do not change if households or firms are the excluded category instead.
147. Further robustness checks
The summary statistics in table 2 indicate that public banks are on average very large 
compared to domestic private banks. If scale economies are present in the Russian banking 
sector, these considerable size differences may explain our results. Note however that there 
are also arguments to hypothesize large Russian private banks may be less efficient than their 
smaller competitors. Claeys and Schoors (2007) find that large Russian banks enjoy 
regulatory forbearance from the part of the Central bank of Russia. This form of soft legal 
constraints implies that managers of larger banks are subject to less regulatory pressure. This 
gives the managers concerned more degrees of freedom to maximize their private benefits of 
control, which may come at the cost of lower efficiency. To control the effect of size we 
repeat our estimations for a size matched sample. The matching procedure for the two sub-
periods runs as follows: 
1. We exclude the largest public banks, Sberbank, Vneshtorgbank and Gazprombank from 
the two samples. They dominate the market and their special status (see above) may 
drive the results. 
2. For each of the remaining public banks, we identify in each time period 20 size-matched 
(size in terms of total assets) private domestic banks. Specifically, we draw the closest 10 
larger and the closest 10 smaller private domestic banks that have not been drawn yet in 
the specific period. This yields two lists of matching banks, one for the sample before 
deposit insurance and one for the sample after deposit insurance. 
3. Finally we make the sample balanced, by dropping all banks that fail to show up in all 4 
quarters of the sub-period. 
This procedure yields ultimately 123 matching private domestic banks before deposit 
insurance (or 492 bank observations) and 141 matching private domestic banks after deposit 
insurance (or 564 bank observations). All foreign banks are retained in the sample. In annex 
A.1 we present the summary statistics of this matched sample. One observes that the size 
differences are now substantially smaller than in the full sample of table 2. 
Insert table 7 around here
In table 7, we repeat the estimations with all possible controls of panel A in table 6. In 
annex A.2 we show the reproduced estimations with the size-matched datasets from the 
remaining panels of table 6. Our three main findings are robust but the estimated efficiency 
gap becomes smaller in most specifications. The public bank variable remains consistently 
negative   in   all   specifications   of   all   panels   although  its   significance   falters   in   some 
specifications of the intermediation approach (see Annex A.2). Apparently the observed 
15efficiency gap between public and private banks is not only driven by size differences or by 
the special position enjoyed by the CBR-owned large public banks, but also by some genuine 
efficiency differences. 
 As a further robustness check we employed a two-stage DEA procedure. In the first 
stage we estimate time specific bank efficiency scores for each quarter. We use the quarterly 
efficiency scores for each bank to compute each bank’s mean efficiency scores for each year 
(2002 before the reform, 2006 after the reform). In a second stage, we regress these mean 
efficiency scores on a set of determinants (public ownership, foreign ownership, activity) 
using a Tobit estimator. .This exercise was performed both on the full and the size-matched 
sample. Results of the second stage Tobit regressions are presented in table 8. Note that 
DEA is a totally different estimation strategy, often leading to quite different results. The 
interpretation of the signs is now different, since DEA measures efficiency rather than 
inefficiency and since the estimates are time-specific rather than panel estimates. 
Insert table 8 around here. 
 In table 8 we observe that foreign banks are again found to be more efficient than 
domestic banks. The efficiency of publicly owned banks is never significantly different from 
that of private banks. The introduction of deposit insurance seems again to be affecting 
efficiency differences in favor of the foreign banks and the public banks. In the case of 
publicly owned banks, the signs of the estimates change from insignificantly negative in 2002 
to insignificantly positive in 2006. 
8. Concluding remarks
In the Russian banking market we document three very robust results with respect to 
bank efficiency. Foreign banks are more efficient than domestic private banks (no surprise), 
domestic private banks are not more efficient than public banks (surprise) and the 
introduction of deposit insurance increased any existing efficiency gap between public and 
private banks (big surprise). These results are not driven by the choice of the production 
process, environment, risk preferences, activity mix, size or econometric approach. 
This result of foreign banks’ superior efficiency is in accordance with most literature 
on this topic in transition countries. Namely, Weill (2003), Fries and Taci (2005) and Bonin 
et al. (2005a) conclude similarly on samples of banks from various transition countries. This 
finding is also very robust to the specifications taking environment, equity, size and structure 
of activities into account. It may find its origin in both reasons proposed by Weill (2003). On 
the one hand, most shareholders of foreign banks are themselves banks. Consequently these 
shareholders  can provide their know-how  in  organization  and risk analysis to  their 
16subsidiaries. On the other hand, foreign banks would benefit from better corporate 
governance as shareholders originating from Western economies would be more used to 
monitoring bank managers.
But why are private banks not more efficient than public banks in Russia?   This 
unexpected finding is neither in accordance with the general prior that public ownership is 
less efficient than private ownership, nor with the findings of Bonin et al. (2005a) and Fries 
and Taci (2005) on cross-country samples of banks from Central and Eastern European 
countries. Implicit state guarantees may have rendered Russia’s public banks’ access to 
deposits less costly in terms of labor and physical capital resulting in higher efficiency. A 
greater depositor base may in turn lead to a greater pool of loan applicants. Therefore, public 
banks may also benefit from granting a higher amount of loans than private banks for the 
same level of costs, because they have to provide fewer efforts to find lenders. But if this 
explanation is true, the creation of a more level playing field by the introduction of a 
generalized deposit insurance scheme, no matter how incomplete, should have mitigated the 
efficiency difference, while we found that the opposite is true. So this explanation must be 
abandoned. Still deposit insurance may have played a role through moral hazard. There is 
strong evidence that Russian private domestic banks were subject to strong and sophisticated 
market discipline before the introduction of deposit insurance (see Karas, Schoors and Pyle, 
2006). This forced them in the direction of more efficiency. The introduction of deposit 
insurance may however have reduced the pressure coming from market discipline, without 
replacing it with sufficiently strong regulatory pressure. In short, the introduction of deposit 
insurance may have introduced moral hazard, leading to more rather than less inefficient 
management practices of private banks. 
Alternatively, the observed increase in the efficiency gap between public and private 
banks may be due to the existence of increased switching costs (see Kim et al., 2003). These 
switching costs notably derive from costs linked to the time and effort to close an account 
and open it elsewhere, to become comfortable with unfamiliar procedures and new bank 
employees, and from costs related to the loss of capitalized value of established relationships. 
Switching costs may also endogenously result from the fact that banks benefit from better 
information on their clients than competitors (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). The widespread 
trust in public banks accumulated through their long dominance of the Russian retail 
markets and the renewed distrust in private banks after the ‘mini-crisis’ of May-July 2004 (see 
above) may have increased switching costs from public to private banks. Stronger even, the 
several weeks of turbulence on the Russian inter-bank market triggered by the CBR’s 
intervention in the case of a bank accused of money-laundering, hampered depositor trust in 
the banking system and led to the "flight to quality" - the shift of deposits from private to 
public banks. 
Given the fact that Russian public banks are not more inefficient than private ones, the 
large state presence in the Russian banking sector is not necessarily the cause of its relative 
inefficiency with the well-known corollaries of lower credit levels and higher financial 
17instability. The implication is that bank privatization will not necessarily improve the 
efficiency of the Russian banking system. Since the main inefficiency seems to reside with 
domestic   private   banks,   the   system’s   efficiency   may   benefit   more   from   increased 
competition than privatization. This can be achieved by creating a more level and more 
stable regulatory playing field for all banks, an objective the CBR is making progress with, 
and by opening the market to foreign competition. In this light, the CBR’s relentless efforts
16 
of the last years (2006-2007) to get rid of inefficient and fraudulent banks regardless of their 
size and the increasing access of foreign banks to the Russian banking sector may be more 
instrumental   in   boosting   the   sector’s   efficiency   than   yet   another   round   of   chaotic 
privatization. 
16 These efforts are deeply resented by some of the banks concerned that fear to loose their license and 
culminated in the brutal murder of the Mr. Kozlov, vice president of the CBR in charge of bank licensing 
policy in October 2006. The CBR reacted by reinforcing its effort to sweep though the banking licenses.
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21Table 1: Some Indicators of recent developments in the Russian banking sector
Data are at the start of period unless indicated otherwise 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Number of credit organizations 2126 2003 1828 1668 1518 1409
     with banking license 1311 1319 1329 1329 1299 1253
     license to attract private deposits 1239 1223 1202 1190 1165 1045
     license to conduct foreign currency operations 764 810 839 845 839 827
     general license 244 262 293 310 311 301
     license for operations with precious metals 163 171 175 181 182 184
Foreign credit organizations with banking license 130 125 126 128 131 136
     fully foreign owned  22 23 27 32 33 41
     50 to 100% foreign owned 11 12 10 9 9 11
Total number of branches  3793 3433 3326 3219 3238 3295
     of which branches of Sberbank 1529 1233 1162 1045 1011 1009
     of which branches of fully foreign owned banks  7 9 12 15 16 29
Corporate Lending/GDP (eop) 17% 19% 22% 25% 27% 32%
Private deposits/GDP 8% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14%
Lending/Gross fixed capital formation (eop) 92% 105% 120% 137% 149% 177%
Inflation (eop) 18.6% 15.1% 12.0% 11.7% 10.9% 9.0%
Deposit rate (period average) 4.9% 5.0% 4.5% 3.8% 4.0% 4.1%
Lending rate (period average) 17.9% 15.7% 13.0% 11.4% 10.7% 10.5%
Sources: Rosstat, CBR and International Financial Statistics (IMF).
Lending was defined of lending of deposit money banks to private and public enterprises, excluding financial 
companies. 
22Table 2: Means of key variables between private and public banks
2002 2006
Private banks Public banks Private banks Public banks
Characteristics
Total assets 1,213.56 17,585.80 2,934.71 160,481.92
Total costs (production) 49.26 593.51 142.65 6,575.91
Total costs (intermediation) 57.90 696.50 168.36 7,941.45
Loans 901.67 12,400.59 2,182.47 118,575.98
Deposits 855.46 9,406.17 2,278.33 127,781.46
Investment assets 73.60 2,283.15 380.68 29,776.67
Price of labor 0.0106 0.0105 0.0102 0.0078
Price of physical capital 1.8113 1.5108 1.8488 2.0085
Price of borrowed funds 0.0111 0.0089 0.0121 0.0110
Equity/total assets 0.2726 0.2348 0.1837 0.1297
Bad loans / loans 0.0184 0.0247 0.0189 0.0114
Loan activities
Household loans / loans 0.0790 0.0232 0.1915 0.1474
Firm loans / loans 0.6649 0.6622 0.6292 0.6654
Government loans / loans 0.0108 0.0104 0.0066 0.0181
Bank loans / loans 0.2453 0.3042 0.1726 0.1691
Deposit activities
Household dep./ deposits 0.2285 0.1267 0.4180 0.3526
Firm deposits / deposits 0.6080 0.5889 0.4796 0.3888
Government dep. /deposits 0.0262 0.1298 0.017 0.1232
Bank dep. / deposits 0.1373 0.1547 0.0908 0.1355
Environment
Moscow area 0.5192 0.5789 0.3706 0.4667
Number of observations 2912 76 1824 60
23Table 3: Means of key variables between domestic and foreign banks
2002 2006
Domestic banks Foreign banks Domestic banks Foreign banks
Characteristics
Total assets 1,385.31 8,414.93 7,521.01 17,674.06
Total cost (production) 55.35 277.95 332.89 677.80
Total cost (intermediation) 64.70 336.12 398.33 812.46
Loans 998.13 6,629.65 5,559.31 13,329.95
Deposits 860.11 6,975.06 5,902.71 14,675.99
Investment assets 111.20 645.49 1,243.35 2,974.54
Price of labor 0.0107 0.0077 0.0103 0.0073
Price of physical capital 1.7828 2.3836 1.8528 1.8800
Price of borrowed funds 0.0112 0.0088 0.0122 0.0096
Equity/total assets 0.2725 0.2462 0.1827 0.1677
Bad loans / loans 0.0184 0.0216 0.0172 0.0508
Loan activities
Household loans / loans 0.0792 0.0337 0.1904 0.1838
Firm loans / loans 0.6718 0.4709 0.6360 0.5036
Government loans / loans 0.0112 0.0001 0.0073 0.0001
Bank loans / loans 0.2379 0.4954 0.1663 0.3125
Deposit activities
Household dep./ deposits 0.2290 0.1401 0.4277 0.1498
Firm deposits / deposits 0.6150 0.4012 0.4809 0.3811
Government dep. /deposits 0.0299 0.0001 0.0159 0.0001
Bank dep. / deposits 0.1261 0.4585 0.0755 0.4691
Environment
Moscow area 0.5118 0.7692 0.3503 0.9000
Number of observations 2884 104 1804 80
Table 4: The inefficiency of public banks according to the production approach
Panel A: Public banks defined as state-owned banks
24Frontier 
characteristics








































Log-likelihood -2203.909 -2192.782 -2189.672 -1278.612 -1270.417 -1200.630
Panel B: Public banks defined as banks that receive a high share of interest income from the government bodies



























-2205.207 -2194.002 -2190.745 -1282.249 -1274.881 -1202.208
‘Environment’ means that regional dummies are included in the estimation of the cost frontier. ‘Equity’ refers to the inclusion of the bank’s equity in the estimation of 
the cost frontier. N=2988 for the first period, N=1884 for the second period. Absolute t-statistics are displayed in parentheses, *, **, *** denote an estimate 
significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% or 1% level.
25Table 5: The inefficiency of public banks according to the intermediation approach 
Panel C: Public banks defined as state-owned banks
Frontier 
characteristics








































Log-likelihood -1983.526 -1972.305 -1968.205 -1040.960 -1035.344 -1015.842
Panel D: Public banks defined as banks that receive a high share of interest income from the government bodies



























-1986.681 -1975.090 -1970.917 -1042.721 -1037.439 -1016.970
‘Environment’ means that regional dummies are included in the estimation of the cost frontier. ‘Equity’ refers to the inclusion of the bank’s equity in the estimation of 
the cost frontier. N=2988 for the first period, N=1884 for the second period. Absolute t-statistics are displayed in parentheses, *, **, *** denote an estimate 
significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% or 1% level.
26Table 6. Robustness to differences in activity mix
Panel A: Public banks defined as state-owned bank/production approach




































Household deposits % Yes Yes - -
Firm deposits % Yes Yes - -
Household loans % Yes Yes - -
Firm loans % Yes Yes - -
Bad loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -2163.004 -2162.106 -2130.126 -2128.461
Post generalized deposit insurance (2006)

















Household deposits % Yes Yes - -
Firm deposits % Yes Yes - -
Household loans % Yes Yes - -
Firm loans % Yes Yes - -
Bad loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -1226;456 -1165.323 -1230.926 -1143.223
27Panel B: Public banks defined as banks that receive a high share of interest income 
from the government bodies/ production approach




































Household deposits % Yes Yes - -
Firm deposits % Yes Yes - -
Household loans % Yes Yes - -
Firm loans % Yes Yes - -
Bad loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -2163.432 -2162.537 -2130.490 -2128.775
Panel B Post generalized deposit insurance (2006)

















Household deposits % Yes Yes - -
Firm deposits % Yes Yes - -
Household loans % Yes Yes - -
Firm loans % Yes Yes - -
Bad loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -1231.047 -1167.378 -1235.123 -1145.789
28Panel C: Public banks defined as state-owned banks / intermediation approach




































Household deposits % Yes Yes - -
Firm deposits % Yes Yes - -
Household loans % Yes Yes - -
Firm loans % Yes Yes - -
Bad loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -1917.841 -1916.956 -1917.810 -1917.737
Post generalized deposit insurance (2006)

















Household deposits % Yes Yes - -
Firm deposits % Yes Yes - -
Household loans % Yes Yes - -
Firm loans % Yes Yes - -
Bad loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -951.341 -932.902 -998.824 -975.377
29Panel D: Public banks defined as banks that receive a high share of interest income 
from the government bodies / intermediation approach




































Household deposits % Yes Yes - -
Firm deposits % Yes Yes - -
Household loans % Yes Yes - -
Firm loans % Yes Yes - -
Bad loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -1919.707 -1918.822 -1919.208 -1919.153
Panel B Post generalized deposit insurance (2006)

















Household deposits % Yes Yes - -
Firm deposits % Yes Yes - -
Household loans % Yes Yes - -
Firm loans % Yes Yes - -
Bad loans % Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -953.868 -934.310 -1000.718 -976.560
30Table 7: Size matched results
Panel A: Public banks defined as state-owned banks / poduction approach
































































Log-likelihood -397.439 -397.026 -390.969 -390.955
Post generalised deposit insurance (2006)













































Log-likelihood -360.661 -332.218 -349.916 -339.517
 
31Table 8: Robustness to other econometric techniques: DEA
Panel A: Public banks defined as state-owned banks, full sample
Frontier 
characteristics
Before generalised deposit insurance (2002) After generalised deposit insurance (2006)
 (a)   (b) (c)  (d)  (e)  (f)

























Activities - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Bad loans - - Yes - - Yes
Log-likelihood 733.983 776.945 785.229 525.603 538.238 538.296
Panel B: Public banks defined as state-owned banks, size-matched sample

























Activities - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Bad loans - - Yes - - Yes
Log-
likelihood
85.342 93.296 94.764 130.483 147.455 149.411
‘Environment’ means that regional dummies are included in the estimation of the cost frontier. ‘Equity’ refers to the inclusion of the bank’s equity in the 
estimation of the cost frontier. N=747 for the first period, N=471 for the second period. Absolute t-statistics are displayed in parentheses, *, **, *** denote an 
estimate significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% or 1% level
32Figure 1: Sberbank’s dominance in the personal deposit market
Source: own calculations based on CBR Bulletin of Bank Statistics and Sberbank


















































































Sberbank private deposits Total private deposits Share of Sberbank in total private deposits
33ANNEX
Table A.1: Means of key variables between private and public banks for the size-matched sample
2002 2006
Private banks Public banks Private banks Public banks
Characteristics
Total assets 5,151.91 7,401.68 8,121.43 32,322.32
Total costs (production) 203.89 281.03 388.71 1,108.36
Total costs (intermediation) 240.25 339.56 459.19 1,352.25
Loans 3,911.10 4,898.84 6,058.27 23,751.46
Deposits 3,763.33 5,315.51 6,332.80 25,765.57
Investment assets 325.33 915.25 1,143.52 5,345.11
Price of labor 0.0083 0.0112 0.0087 0.0087
Price of physical capital 2.4495 1.2885 2.1035 1.5660
Price of borrowed funds 0.0105 0.0086 0.0125 0.0111
Equity/total assets 0.2149 0.2313 0.1448 0.1341
Bad loans / loans 0.0207 0.0229 0.0203 0.0107
Loan activities
Household loans / loans 0.0495 0.0248 0.1632 0.1591
Firm loans / loans 0.6163 0.6586 0.6431 0.6606
Government loans / loans 0.0099 0.0111 0.0074 0.0189
Bank loans / loans 0.3243 0.3055 0.1862 0.1614
Deposit activities
Household dep./ deposits 0.1977 0.1204 0.3755 0.3561
Firm deposits / deposits 0.5180 0.5858 0.4606 0.3872
Government dep. 
/deposits
0.0359 0.1438 0.0186 0.1452
Bank dep. / deposits 0.2484 0.1501 0.1454 0.1115
Environment
Moscow area 0.6016 0.5882 0.5106 0.4167
Number of observations 492 68 564 48
34Table A.2 Further size matched results
Panel B: Public banks defined as banks that receive a high share of interest income from 
the government bodies / poduction approach
































































Log-likelihood -399.040 -397.810 -390.961 -390.958
Post generalized deposit insurance (2006)













































Log-likelihood -365.493 -320.609 -350.452 -340.378
35Panel C: Public banks defined as state-owned banks /intermediation approach
































































Log-likelihood -327.203 -326.982 -333.275 -331.822
Post generalised deposit insurance (2006)













































Log-likelihood -220.328 -218.397 -205.273 -200.991
36Panel D: Public banks defined as banks that receive a high share of interest income from 
the government bodies / intermediation approach
































































Log-likelihood -331.408 -331.208 -334.246 -332.787
Post generalized deposit insurance (2006)













































Log-likelihood -223.653 -222.113 -205.615 -201.543
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